

# Central European Program in Economic Theory (1998-2018...)

## Workshop 2018



THURSDAY 28 JUNE	
<b>09.30 – 11.00 Chair: Nicholas Baigent</b>	
Susumu Cato <i>University of Tokyo</i>	Representing Suzumura-Consistent Collective Choice Rules
Kohei Kamaga <i>Sophia University, Tokyo</i>	An Axiomatization of the Mixed Bentham-Rawls Social Welfare Orderings
– coffee break 15 minutes –	
<b>11.15 – 12.45 Chair: Anne van den Nouweland</b>	
Xinyang Wang <i>Yale University</i>	Second Order Secret Love
Martin Gregor <i>Charles University, Prague</i>	Electives Shopping, Grading Competition, and Grading Norms
<b>12.45 – 14.30 Lunch</b>	
<b>14.30 – 16.00 Chair: Flavio Pressacco</b>	
Yu Chen <i>University of Graz</i>	Simplification of Contracting under Adverse Selection with Ex Post State
Marieke Pahlke <i>Bielefeld University</i>	Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors
– coffee break 15 minutes –	
<b>16.15 – 17:45 Chair: Ludovic Julien</b>	
Mikhail Klimenko <i>Georgia Institute of Technology</i>	Language, Internet and Platform Competition
Alexander Shapoval <i>National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow</i>	Two and a Half Oligopolies in the Sea of the Competitive Fringe
<b>20.00 Dinner</b>	

*Palazzo Antonini, via Petracco 8, Room 3, Università di Udine*

FRIDAY 29 JUNE	
<b>09.30 – 11.00 Chair: Francesca Busetto</b>	
Philipp Külpmann <i>University of Vienna</i>	Trade Network Formation
Martin Farnham <i>University of Victoria</i>	The Road to Ruin: Parasitic Suburbs and the Fundamental Law of Traffic Congestion
– coffee break 15 minutes –	
<b>11.15 – 12.45 Chair: Christopher Ellis</b>	
Sylta Cornils <i>European University Institute</i>	Corruption and Risk: How Corruption Raises and Reduces Risk
Anne van den Nouweland <i>University of Oregon</i>	Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations
<b>12.45 – 14.30 Lunch</b>	
<b>14.30 – 16.00 Chair: Mark Johnson</b>	
Stefano Barbieri <i>Tulane University</i>	Complementarity and Information in Collective Action
Gerald Pech <i>KIMEP, Almaty</i>	The Autocrat's Governance Problem and Emergence of Property Rights
– coffee break 15 minutes –	
<b>16.15 – 18.30 Chair: Giulio Codognato</b>	
Elisabeth Gugl <i>University of Victoria</i>	The Rotten Kid Theorem and Almost Transferable Utility
Daniele Caliori <i>Queen Mary University, London</i>	Inference of Welfare from Choice Observations - a Necessary Informational Property
Walter Bossert <i>University of Montreal</i>	The Measurement of Welfare Change
<b>18.30 – 18.45 CEPET Committee Meeting and 20.00 Dinner</b>	